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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ELOY PAUL LOPEZ, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16532 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, ELOY PAUL LOPEZ, appeals from his con-
riction of the crime of Murder in the Second Degree, in the 
Mstrict Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for the 
County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, 
Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
After trial and conviction by jury, the Court entered 
:Jdgment of guilty for the the crime of Murder in the Second 
Degree against the appellant and subsequently committed the 
appellant to the Utah State Prsion for the term as provided by 
:aw, of Five Years to Life. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the case dismissed, or in the 
(~rnative, to have the case remanded to the Third Judicial 
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District Court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 10, 1977, the appellant and one Lynn 
Oliver had a fight in the Drift Inn Bar in Lark, Utah. The fight 
continued for some time inside the bar at which point Lynn Oliver 
appeared to be getting the best of the appellant. The bar tender, 
Meryl Watson, put both combatants outside of the bar to continue 
the fight. (R. 246). 
The fight continued outside the back door of the Drift 
Inn Bar with several observers peering through the back window 
of the establishment. One of the observers, Kimberly Horrocks, 
went out of the front door of the establishment while the fight 
was going on in the back parking lot. 
Miss Horrocks testified that after leaving through the 
front door, she went around the outside of the building in 
order to be able to more closely observe the fight. Miss Horrocks 
testified that she saw Lynn Oliver fall down. She also testified 
that when after Lynn Oliver was on the ground, she saw the 
appellant walk over to him and kick him. (R. 363). Mr. Oliver 
rolled over according to her testimony, and the appellant kicked 
him again. 
Other observers testified that they witnessed the 
victim, Lynn Oliver, on the ground and that they observed the 
appellant holding the victim in his arms and giving him mouth 
to mouth resuscitation. (R. 297). Paramedics were dispatched 
to the location of the fight. Subsequently, they performed 
- 2 -
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~irst aid measures on Lynn Oliver, and subsequently transported 
~m to the hospital. (R. 405). 
After Lynn Oliver's arrival at the hospital he was 
treated by Dr. John Sanders. Dr. Sanders testified that he 
treated the victim, Lynn Oliver, after his arrival at the 
hospital. He testified that he attempted to treat Lynn Oliver's 
apparent brain damage through the use of chemicals, but that he 
~elt that the victim had no chance for neurological recovery. 
I 
'[R. 463). The doctor further testified that after two EEG's 
had been performed showing no brain activity that Lynn Oliver 
~s neurologically dead and subsequently the machines maintal~lng 
lifu support of the victim were turned off. Subsequently, all 
life functions ceased. 
Deputy State Medical Examiner, Terry H. Rich, testified 
that he was the pathologist who performed the autopsy on Lynn 
Oliver on November 13, 1977. He testified that he observed 
Rltiple abrasions on the head and face of the body of Lynn Oliver 
md that he observed two fractures of the skull and that underneath 
:he skull he observed a significant subdural hemorrhage between 
~e bone on top of the brain tissue. (R. 425). Dr. Rich testified 
:hat the subdural hemorrhaging would have been the cause of the 
ieath of Lynn 01 i ver. (R. 426). 
Dr. Rich further testified that the nature of the 
:ractures was such that they would have to have been caused by 
:;par ate forces of some sort. (R. 428). Dr. Rich testified that 
~nature of the injuries was consistent with the victim having 
- 3 -
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been kicked twice; once from one direction, from the left side 
of his head, and once on the forehead, by a boot. (R. 429). 
The appellant testified in his own behalf that he 
was, in fact, involved in a fight with the victim but denied 
having kicked the victim while the victim layed on the ground. 
The appellant stated that on the lOth day of November, 1977, 
that he was drinking with the victim when they became involved 
in a fight. (R. 498). The appellant and the victim struggled 
inside the bar for some time after which Meryl Watson threw 
them both outside. (R. 501). After they were outside, both 
parties swung at one another, drunkenly, both of them fell down. 
The victim then started to shake and went into convulsions. The 
appellant took out the victim's false teeth and gave him mouth 
to mouth resuscitation. (R. 505). Appellant denied having at 
any time kicked the victim in the head. (R. 519). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF 
ANOTHER CRIME IN VIOLATION OF RULE 55 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF EVIDENCE. 
The appellant testified in his own behalf that the 
death of Lynn Oliver occurred during mutual combat between the 
appellant and Lynn Oliver. The appellant testified that the 
fight on the lOth day of November, 1977, arose out of an argument 
over a fight that had occurred approximately two weeks earlier 
between the appellant and a third individual named "Donny". 
(R. 492). 
- 4 -
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On cross examination of the appellant, counsel for 
the respondent sought to develop the details of that earlier 
fight. Counsel asked whether, on that earlier occasion, he 
had kicked Donny in the head while Donny lay on the ground. 
counsel for appellant objected to this question and moved for 
a mistrial, which motions were denied and the appellant's 
answer of "no" was allowed to stand. (R. 518). 
In rebuttal, the respondent called to the witness 
stand Janice Ortega, who testified, over appellant's objection, 
that on the earlier occasion of the fight between appellant and 
"Donny" that she had observed the appellant kick "Donny" while 
he lay on the ground. (R. 556). Counsel made repeated object-
wns to the testimony including a motion for a mistrial, (R. 557), 
out the motions were denied and the testimony of the details of 
the earlier altercation were admitted into evidence. Appellant 
subsequently moved for a new trial which motion was denied. (R. 
2!1,217). 
The effect of the testimony is clear. The respondent 
:1ad earlier introduced the testimony of Kimberly Horrocks that 
she witnessed the appellant kicking Lynn Oliver in the head while 
r.e lay on the ground. The appellant denied that he kicked Lynn 
iliver. (R. 518). 
Respondent introduced evidence of another criminal act 
ent :n order to discredit the appellant generally as well as to 
.:peach appellant's testimony that he did not kick Lynn Oliver 
~t~ occasion of which the instant charges arose. The earlier 
~~ged incident of kicking was used to prove similar conduct 
- 5 -
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on another occasion. In addition, the prejudicial effect of 
such testimony is apparent. 
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence makes evidence 
of other crimes generally inadmissible. The substance of Rule 
55 is as follows: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed 
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, is 
inadmissible to prove his disposition to commit crime 
or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he 
committed another crime or civil wrong on another 
specified occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48 such 
evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some 
other material fact including absence of mistake or 
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge or identity. (Rule 55, Utah Rules of 
Evidence.) 
The provisions of Rule 55 are taken directly from the 
Uniform Rules of Evidence (Rule 55) and are substantially 
similar to Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. While 
the Utah Rules of Evidence became effective in 1971, the substance 
of Rule 55 had been in effect some time before that, since the 
Utah Supreme Court expressly adopted a similar rule promulgated 
by the American Law Institute in its Model Code of Evidence in 
the case of State v. Scott, 175 P.2d 1016 (1947). 
The reasons for the general inadmissability of prior 
bad acts have been widely recognized by legal scholars. As 
Professor Norman Garland said in an article entitled Impeachment 
Through Proof of Prior Bad Acts and Prior Convictions, prepared 
for the National College of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Public 
Defenders, June, 1978: 
Evidence of character in any form, whether reputation, 
opinion from observation, or specific acts will not 
- 6 -
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ce 
generally be received to prove that the person whose 
character is sought to be shown engaged in certain 
conduct, or did so with a given intent on a particular 
occasion. The reason for this rule is that when 
character is used for this purpose it is not essential, 
as it is when character is in issue, and generally it 
comes with too much dangerous baggage of prejudice, 
distraction from the issues, time consumption, and 
hazards of surprise. This long established rule thus 
forbids the prosecution, unless and until the accused 
gives evidence of good character, to introduce init-
ially evidence of bad character of the accused. It 
is not irrelevant, but in the setting of jury trial the 
danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value. Bad 
character and prior bad acts may not be shown for prOOf 
of action in conformity therewith. 
)lcCormick is in accord: 
The long-established rule, accordingly, forbids the 
prosecution, unless and until the accused gives 
evidence of his good character, to introduce initlally 
evidence of the bad character of the accused. It is 
not irrelevant, but in the setting of jury trial the 
danger of prejudice outweighs the probative value. 
This danger is at its highest when character is shown 
by other criminal acts, and the rule about the proof of 
other crimes is but an application of the wider prohib-
ition against the initial introduction by the prosecution 
of evidence of bad character. The rule is that the pro-
secution may not introduce evidence of other criminal 
acts of the accused unless the evidence is substantially 
relevant for some other purpose than to show a probab-
ility that he committed the crime on trial because he is 
a man of criminal character. 
However, courts have long accepted, and Rule 55 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence provide for, exceptions to the inadrnissabili ty 
of prior criminal or civil wrongs generally. Rule 55 lists the 
exceptions recognized in this jurisdiction: "absence of mistake 
or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
:·nowledge or identity". 
- 7 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The question before this Court is quite simply: Which 
of the exceptions set forth above could possibly accommodate the 
admission of testimony about the earlier altercation between the 
appellant and the victim? The evidence belies any contention 
that absence of mistake or accident could be made. Prior fights 
or arguments frequently relate to motive in homicide cases. (See 
People v. Thiede, 11 Utah 281, 39 P. 837 (1895). 
However, there is no contention in this case that there 
was "bad blood" between the victim and the appellant. To the 
contrary, the record is replete with evidence that the two 
combatants were friends. It is uncontroverted that on the evening 
in question contact between the victim and the appellant began as 
a few drinks together as friends. The appellant testified that 
he regarded the victim as a friend. (R. 507). Immediately after 
the victim lapsed into convulsion the appellant gave mouth-to-
mouth resuscitation in a futile attempt to save the victim's life. 
(R. 509). There was no contention by the prosecution that the 
earlier events constituted a motive for intentional killing, and 
the facts do not support such a contention. 
The exceptions of motive, opportunity, intent, preparatJor 
plan, knowledge and identity are all not applicable in this case. 
The evidence before this Court and jury as the appellant was asked 
about the details of the previous fight obviated the necessity for b, 
further inquiry into the events. 
The true purpose underlying the respondents's delving 
into this aspect of the earlier fight is clear. The impact upon 
- 8 -
c: 
lJ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the jury of showing that the appellant had kicked another 
person on another occasion would be to buttress directly the 
respondent's contention that the appellant kicked the victim on 
this occasion. It is precisely this type of inference which is 
unacceptable under Rule 55. 
The admission on rebuttal of the testimony of Janice 
Ortega was nothing more than a thinly disguised attempt to show 
that appellant had a propensity for violent criminal acts, and 
us prejudicial to him. As the Court stated in State v. Green, 
578 P.2d 512 (Utah 1978): 
. in the interest of justice the defendant is 
entitled to be tried on the charge against him, 
and without having any prejudice aroused by 
attempting to disgrace him, or show a disposition 
to commit crime. (578 P. 2d at 513-514). 
The effect of such evidence as was here introduced 
was to inflame and prejudice the jury and to deny appellant a 
fair trial. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that pursuit of 
ruch collateral issues had no legitimate purpose and was prejudicial 
iH well. In State v. Dickson, 12 Utah (2d) 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), 
:Jor the Court reversed defendant's conviction of robbery. The Court 
indicated that allowing cross-examination of defendant as to details 
,0 of a prior felony conviction was reversible error, but apparently 
Jr based its reversal on a "matter of graver importance". During 
cyoss-examination of defendant, the prosecutor was allowed to elicit 
testimony of a "disturbance" in Texas, where defendant had been shot, 
lnd later charged, but not tried, on the offense of being an 
:ccessory to a robbery. 
I 
The Court found the Texas incident to be 
I 
- 9 -
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irrelevant to modus operandi . 
. the Texas incident would have no legitimate 
probative value as to defendant's complicity in 
the robbery charged here. It's only effect would 
be to cast aspersions upon the defendant and to 
imply that because he was involved in the Texas 
trouble he is a person of evil character who would 
be likely to commit such a crime as here charged. 
The very purpose of excluding such evidence is to 
prevent the prosecution from smearing an accused 
by showing a bad reputation and relying on that 
for a conviction, rather than being required to 
produce adequate proof of the crime in question. 
(361 P.2d at 412). 
The impact of the evidence of the earlier fight was 
precisely the same as the evidence of unrelated crime in State 
v. Kazda, 14 Utah (2d) 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963): 
It implied that the defendant was implicated in other 
crimes, none of them proven, and could have no other 
effect than to degrade the defendant and give to the 
jury the impression that he had a propensity for 
crime. It is true that the defendant admitted prior 
felony convictions, but 'we cannot say with any de-
gree of assurance that there would not have been a 
different result' in the absence of such testimony. 
(382 P.2d at 409 and quoting Dickson, supra.) 
Nor can it be claimed that the appellant somehow opened 
up this additional, unrelated area by taking the witness stand. 
While it was necessary to set the fight that resulted in the 
death of Lynn Oliver in context, inquiry into irrelevant details 
had no legitimate purpose and had no direct bearing either on 
the State's theory of the case or on the defense presented by the 
defendant. 
State v. Putzell, 40 Wash. 2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952) 
is of interest, there defendant was convicted of first degree 
murder. Defendant, in addition to pleading not guilty, entered 
- 10 -
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ed 
a plea of insanity or mental irresponsibility. The evidence 
showed that defendant entered a tavern, approached deceased 
and fired several shots, one of which hit deceased. Deceased 
then ran outside, got in a cab, and stated he wanted to go to 
ilie hospital. Defendant followed deceased to the cab, and 
pulled him from it. Defendant then fired three or four more 
shots into deceased, as he lie on his back. A police officer 
arrived and disarmed defendant. Defendant stated to the officer: 
"Leave me alone. I have been after this guy 
for a long time and I'm going to get him." 
(242 P.2d at 182). 
At the trial, defendant testified in his own behalf. 
He stated that some two years before the homicide, deceased 
had as saul ted him without provocation, and that deceased had 
struck him on the head with a fire hose nozzle. Defendant 
stated that as a result of this assault, he was unconscious for 
aperiod of some thirteen hours; that surgery was required, in 
which pieces of skull were removed; that he had become extremely 
~rvous and unable to sleep; that he suffered blackouts, fear 
1 of busses and planes; and that his head felt as though ants 
Wre crawling in it and an iron band was exerting pressure on it. 
During cross-examination of defendant, he denied that 
;,e had carried a gun on the night of the assault two years 
Defore the homicide. The state rebutted over defendant's object-
-en with two witnesses who testified that while defendant had been 
-~conscious, they had removed a pistol and knife from his pocket· 
- 11 -
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The trial court held that the evidence was proper rebuttal 
to defendant's testimony that he was a peaceful, lawabiding 
citizen, and that it was not impeaching on a collateral matter. 
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. The Court 
noted that defendant did not deny the shooting, and that his 
main defense was lack of mental responsibility, caused by 
deceased's previous aggressive attack. The Court recognized 
that it was proper for the State to show that defendant, not 
deceased, had been the aggressor, but that the evidence which 
the State had presented on that issue was not probative of it. 
" ... such testimony was not relevant or material 
as to the issue of whether or not appellant was the 
aggressor, and tended to invite the jury to guess, 
speculate and conjecture." (242 P.2d at 185). 
As to whether the evidence was proper rebuttal to 
defendant's testimony of his lawabiding nature, the Court noted E· 
that it was defendant who had raised the issue initially, but ~ 
held nevertheless that the State could not rebut defendant's PI 
testimony by showing specific acts of misconduct, stating: 01 
"No rule permits the general character of the u 
defendant, even when directly put in issue, to 1 
be impeached by showing the commission by him tr 
of a specific crime, other than the one for which 
he is on trial." (242 P. 2d at 185). ar 
A fortiori, when the character of a defendant is not 
in issue, it is improper to attempt to show his bad character cc 
by specific acts. ~ 
The Court in Putzell, supra, also held the matter to be 
be collateral and therefore inadmissible to impeach defendant's ~ 
testimony. 
Finally, (and perhaps most significantly), the Court 
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stated: 
"Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the 
rebuttal testimony in question might have been 
material; still it should not have been admitted 
because its inflammatory nature so far out-
weighed any materiality it might had had as to 
be prejudicial. Here was a man being tried on 
a charge of first degree murder. His defense 
was that he was mentally irresponsible as the 
result of a prior unprovoked assault on him by 
the deceased, and in which occurrence he was not 
the aggressor. The state, to rebut that con-
tention, introduced evidence of finding a gun 
and a knife in his pocket. The purpose of that 
testimony was to portray him as a vicious, 
quarrelsome man. The very inflammatory nature 
of this testimony leaves no margin for specu-
lation as to whether or not the jury was swayed 
by it." (242 P.2d at 186). 
The appellant submits that the purpose of Janice Ortega's 
testimony was identical to the reason set forth in Putzell, supra. 
There is one other disturbing aspect of this case. 
Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the incident was in some 
way relevant (which appellant does not concede), whatever minimal 
probative value it might have had was greatly outweighed by its 
overwhelming potential of creating undue prejudice. The purpose of 
mtroducing the incident was to mislead the jury to the conclusion 
I 
'that appellant was an evil or bad person, one who is quarrelsome 
lnd likely to resort to deadly weapons without justification. 
By eliciting the testimony the prosecution misled and 
confused the jury beyond the issue of appellant's character. The 
:ntroduction of the testimony was desirable to the prosecution not 
tecause it shed light directly on the death of the victim in this 
case, but because it put before the jury damaging and prejudicial 
- 13 -
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information about the defendant's character. 
It is precisely this type of information that the 
Rules of Evidence seek to .avoid. Rule 45 states: 
" ... the judge may in his discretion exclude 
evidence if he finds that its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the risk that its 
admission will . . . (b) create substantial dan-
ger of undue prejudice or of confusing the jury, 
(Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence). 
The questions and rebuttal testimony should have been excluded 
because they did "create substantial danger of undue prejudice", 
and should have been excluded by the trial court judge. 
Under Rule 45 the trial court's failure to exclude 
such evidence was an abuse of discretion and reversible error. 
The admission of the evidence also violated Rule 47, 
which allows proof of character traits, when relevant, pursuant 
to Rule 46, except 
" ... that (a) evidence of specific instances of 
conduct other than evidence of conviction of a 
crime which tends to prove the conduct bad shall be 
inadmissible, and (b) in a criminal action evidence 
of an accused's character ... (ii) if offered by 
the prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted 
only after the accused has introduced evidence of 
his good character." 
The admission of the evidence violated Rule 47(a), 
since a specific instance of conduct was admitted, and it was 
not a conviction of a crime. Rule 47(b) (ii) was also violated, 
since the appellant did not introduce "evidence of his good 
character". 
In short, there is simply no justification for the 
admission of the evidence of the details of an earlier fight 
- 14 -
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with another individual. In addition the evidence regarding 
the kicking of a third party on another occasion was prejudicial 
and warrants reversal of the conviction of the appellant in this 
case. 
POINT II 
THE COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON THE LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MANSLAUGHTER. 
The appellant, ELOY PAUL LOPEZ, was charged with the offense 
of Murder in the Second Degree in violation of Section 76-5-203(b) 
and (c) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). (R. 28). The State 
alleged the following alternative theories for a Second Degree 
Hurder charge, that either appellant under: 
or 
" . . . Subsection (b) intending to cause serious 
bodily injury to Lynn Oliver, he committed an act 
clearly dangerous to human life that caused the 
death of Lynn Oliver" 
" . . . Subsection (c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, 
he recklessly engaged in conduct which created 
a great risk of death to Lynn Oliver and thereby 
caused the death of Lynn Oliver." 
Both of these theories were submitted to the jury by 
~e Court in its instructions. (R. 154). 
The appellant requested instructions on the lesser 
lncluded offense of Manslaughter under §76-5-205 Utah Code Annotated 
'1953 as amended) . (R. 90). The appellant submitted the theory 
cf Manslaughter as a lesser included offense under three alternative 
:heories. (R. 90). That appellant caused the death of Lynn Oliver 
- 15 -
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under one of the following circumstances: 
A. That the appellant recklessly caused the 
death of Lynn Oliver.l 
B. That the appellant caused the death of Lynn 
Oliver under the influence of extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance for whic~ there is a 
reasonable explanation or excuse; or 
c. That the appellant caused the death of Lynn 
Oliver under circumstances where appellant 
reasonably believed the circumstances provided 
a moral or legal justification or extenuation 
for his conduct although the conduct is not 
legally justifiable or excusable under the 
existing circumstances.3 
The trial court refused to submit appellant's requested 
instruction Number 3 on the alternative theories Band C of ManslauahtH 
to the jury. (R. 158). And appellant took proper exception to 
the Court's failure to so instruct. 4 
l. Section 76-5-205(a) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
2. Section 76-5-205(b) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
3. Section 76-5-205(c) Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended). 
4. Counsel for appellant requested both Instructions 3 and l 
in writing and took exception to the trial court's failure 
to give such request to the jury, properly preserving this 
issue on appeal. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51. 
State v. Erickson, Utah, 568 P. 2d 750 (1977); State v. Bell, 
563 P.2d 186 (1977); and State v. Gleason, 17 u.2d 150, 
405 P.2d 793 (1965). Accord: Rules of Practice in the 
District Courts, Rule 5.4. 
- 16 -
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A. THE DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL CASE HAS A RIGHT 
TO SUBMIT HIS THEORY OF THE CASE TO THE JURY IN 
THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
It has long been the law in the State of Utah, that an 
accused in a criminal action has a right to submit to the jury 
his theory of the case, and that such theory when properly 
requested should be given to the jury in the form of written 
instructions. State v. Stenbeck, 78 U. 350, 2 P.2d 1050 (1931). 
In Utah this right allows for the presentation of instructions on all 
defenses and theories, including lesser included offenses, when 
such are properly requested by the accused. State v. Gillian, 23 
Utah 372, 374, 463 P.2d 811 (1970); State v. Mitcheson, Utah, 560 
P.2d ll20 (1977). 
An accused may make the decision as a matter of trial 
strategy to go "for broke" and decline to request instructions on 
~sser included offense if his theory of defense so dictates. 
State v. Mora, Utah, 558 P.2d 1335, 1337 (1977); State v. Gellaty, 
22 U.2d 149, 152, 449 P.2d 993 (1969); State v. Valdez, 79 U.2d 
426, 428, 432 P.2d 53 (1967); State v. Mitchell, 3 U.2d 70, 278 
P.2d 618 (1955). However, when the accused as his theory of the 
case requests instructions on lesser included offenses and is 
rilling to submit his guilt or innocence to the jury on that 
llieory, the trial court as a general rule is duty bound to submit 
these alternatives to the trier of the fact. State v. Gillian, 
23 U.2d 374, 375, 463 P.2d 8ll (1970). 
When the theory of defense embraces an argument, in 
effect in mitigation, that he is guilty of not the crime as 
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charged in the Information but some lesser offense the teachings 
of Gillian yet apply. On this point the Gillian court stated: 
One of the fundamental principles to the 
submission of issues to juries is that where 
the parties so request they are entitled to 
have instruction given on their theory of 
the case; and this includes on lesser offenses 
if any reasonable view of the evidence would 
support such a verdict. (State v. Gillian, 
supra, 23 U.2d at 374). 
In Gillian this court pointed out the reasons for this 
rule and the instant case illustrates the soundness of such a rule. 
This court said it should not be the prerogative of the trial court 
to direct the jury as to what degree of crime they may find a 
defendant guilty or to direct them that they must find him not 
guilty if they do not find him guilty of the greater offense. m 
allow this permits the court to be a judge of the facts and to in 
effect direct a verdict on the lesser included offenses. Such a 
procedure violates the historical spirit as well as letter of our 
system of jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to 
the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 10 and 12 
of the Constitution of Utah. State v. Ferguson, 74 Utah 263, 279 
P.2d (1929) (Straup, J. concurring). See also United States v. 
Skinner, 437 F.2d 164, 165 (5th Cir. 1971). 
B. MANSLAUGHTER IS A LESSER AND INCLUDED OFFENSE 
OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
The test most recently given to determine if one of~n~ 
is a lesser included offense of another is that found in the 
recently revised Utah Criminal Code. Utah Code Annotated 
§76-1-402 (3) (1953 as amended) provides in pertinent part: 
- 18 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1le. 
lurt 
ro 
in 
j[ 
to 
79 
nse 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included 
in the offense charged but may not be convicted of 
both the offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or 
less than all the facts required to establish 
the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, 
conspiracy, or form of preparation to commit the 
offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute 
as a lesser included offense.5 
The process by which such a determination is made was described in 
state v. Woolman, 84 Utah 23, 33 P.2d 640 (1934): 
The only way this matter may be determined is by 
discovering all of the elements required by the 
respective sections, comparing them and by a 
process of inclusion and exclusion, determine 
those common and those not common, and, if the 
greater offense includes all legal and factual 
elements, it may safely be said that the greater 
includes the lesser, if, however, the lesser 
offense requires the inclusion of some necessary 
element or elements in order to cover the 
completed offense, not so included in the 
greater offense, then it may be safely said 
that the lesser is not necessarily included in 
the greater. (33 P.2d at 645). 
C. WHEN MUST THE TRIAL COURT INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES. 
Conceding that Manslaughter is a lesser included offense 
of Murder in the Second Degree under Utah's statutes, the issue 
5. This statute was recently interpreted in State v. Lloyd, 
Utah 568 P.2d 357 (1977) and its companion case, State 
v. Cornish, Utah, 568 P.2d (1977) wherein this Court held 
that the Utah joyriding statute is a lesser included 
offense of theft of an operable motor vehicle. 
- 19 -
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then becomes when must the trial court instruct the jury on 
such a lesser included offense. 
The need that such an instruction be given has been 
ruled to be a statutory requirement and is found in Utah Code 
Annotated §77-33-6 (1953 as amended), which states: 
The jury may find the defendant guilty of any 
offense the commission of which is necessarily 
included in that with which he is charged in 
the indictment or information, or of an attempt 
to commit the offense. 
This provision was expounded upon by the legislature in 
the 1973 Criminal Code Revision in §76-1-402(4) which provides: 
The court shall not be obligated to charge the 
jury with respect to an included offense unless 
there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
the defendant of the offense charged and convicting 
him of the included offense. (Emphasis Supplied). 
The foregoing provision, as this Court noted, codifies 
prior existing common law principles dating back to territorial 
times in Utah. People v. Robinson, 6 U. 101, 21 P.403 (1889); 
State v. Bender, Utah, 581 P.2d 1019 (1978). 
In State v. Bartias, 91 Utah 574, 65 P.2d 1130 (1937), 
this Court noted that the failure to give an instruction on 
lesser included offenses when requested " .. clashes with 
two fundamental rules of trial in criminal cases: It has the 
effect of the court weighing the evidence and, in effect, limiti~ 
the jury to a consideration of only part of the evidence (the 
defendant's); and it, in effect, casts upon the accused the 
burden of proving his innocence or justification." (65 P.2d at llJli 
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When the accused requests a lesser included instruc-
tion there should exist a presumption that the requested 
instruction be given. 6 Such is the tenor of this Court's 
discussions in the past. In State v. Hyams, 64 U. 285, 230 P.2d 
349 (1924), it was stated: 
It is, however, always a delicate matter for a 
trial court to withhold from the jury the right 
to find the accused guilty of a lesser or included 
offense, and determine the question of the state 
of the evidence as matter of law. That should be 
done only in very clear cases. (64 U.2 at 287) 
Accord: State v. Bartias, 91 U. 574, 580, 65 P.2d 
1130 (1937). (Emphas1s Supplied). 
In recent years this Court has endeavored to set specific 
guidelines providing for the submission of lesser included offenses 
~1hen requested. 
1 
The statutory necessity of instructing a jury on a 
lesser included offense was described in State v. Dougherty, 
Utah 550 P.2d 175 (1976). This Court cited Lisby v. State, 83 Nev. 
183, 414 P.2d 592 (1966), which followed a provision similar to 
Utah Code Annotated §77-33-6 (1953). Describing the holding of the 
~vada Court this Court said: 
6. This seems to be the feeling of the court in State v. Gillian, 
supra, 23 U. 2d at 376 wherein it is said: 
The usual rule on an appeal in which the challenge 
is to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict, is that we review the record in the light 
favorable to the jury's verdict. However, in this 
situation where the question raised relates to the 
refusal to submit included offenses, it is our 
duty to survey the whole evidence and the inferences 
naturally to be deduced therefrom to see whether there 
is any reasonable basis therein which would support a 
conviction of the lesser offenses. 
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The Court discussed three situations in which 
the problem of lesser included offenses are 
frequently encountered. First, where there is 
evidence which would absolve the defendant from 
guilt of a greater offense, or degree, but would 
support a finding of guilt of a lesser offense, 
or degree; the instruction is mandatory. 
Second, where the evidence would not support 
a finding of guilt in the commission of the 
lesser offense or degree. For example, the 
defendant denies any complicity in the crime 
charged, and thus lays no foundation for any 
intermediate verdict; or where the elements of 
the offenses differ, and some element essential 
to the lesser offense is either not proved or 
shown not to exist. This second situation 
renders an instruction on a lesser included 
offense erroneous, because it is not pertinent. 
Third, is an intermediate situation. One where 
the elements of the greater offense include all 
elements of the lesser offense; becuae, by its 
very nature, the greater offense could not have 
been committed without defendant having the intent 
in doing the acts, which constitute the lesser 
included offense. In such a situation instructions 
on the lesser included offense may be given, be-
cause all elements of the lesser offense have been 
given. However, such an instruction may properly 
be refused if the prosecution has met its burden 
of proof on the greater offense, and there is 
no evidence tending to reduce the greater offense. 
The court concluded by stating that if there be 
any evidence, however slight, on any reasonable 
theory of the case under which the defendant 
might be convicted of a lesser included offense, 
the court must, if requested, give an appropriate 
instruction. (550 P.2d at 176-177). 7 
The question that arises then when lesser included 
instructions are requested is: was there . any evidence, 
7. State v. Dougherty, supra, has been followed in State v. 
Pierre, Utah 572 P.2d 1338, 1355 (1977), and State v. Bell, 
563 P.2d 186, 188 (1977). 
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however slight, on any reasonable theory under which the defendant 
might be convicted of the lesser (and) included offense . . 
of manslaughter. State v. Dougherty, supra, at 177; State v. 
Bell, Utah, 563 P. 2d 186, 188 (1977) (Justice Wilkins, concurring). 
If there was such evidence, then the instructions were properly re-
quested and should have been submitted to the jury for consideration. 
In the instant case appellant conceded the mutual combat 
~tween himself and the deceased. (R. 481 et seq.). The evidence 
adduced throughout the trial indicated a barroom brawl between the 
two participants. Part and parcel of appellant's defense was that 
due to the alcohol consumed by he and Oliver, that the fight just 
escalated. The testimony was uncontradicted that at least at one 
point Oliver was getting the best of appellant. 
The trial court although submitting the alternative theories 
of Second Degree Murder offered by the State refused to provide the 
]ury with the opportunity to apply the facts adduced to the alter-
native Manslaughter therories offered by appellant. 
It was for the jury's decision to decide whether or 
not for example the appellant's actions, although not legally 
Justified under a theory of self-defense, rose to the level of 
~anslaughter, since appellant reasonable believed his actions were 
:ustified. This theory was offered in appellant's proposed 
Instruction No. 3. (R. 90). It was conceivable that the jury 
OOuld have found the appellant acted intentionally or knowingly 
or with a depraved indifference to human life, but reasonably 
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believed his actions justified under the Manslaughter alternative 
theory. The jury also might have conceded the State's theory, but 
found, due to the alcohol consumed and other factors involved, 
that the appellant was acting under extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance for which his explanation or excuse was reasonable. 
Under the confused circumstances of this barroom confront· 
ation, it was for the jury to determine on all the evidence and 
proper instruction of alternative theory the degree of offense, 
if any, committed. In review of the decision of the trial court, 
this Court must bear in mind that the circumstances of this case 
provide a classic example of the escalation of a mutual combat 
situation where one of the participants over-reacts and a death 
results. Remembering that the deceased was a lifelong friend of 
appellant's and their argument resulted in mutual combative fisti-
cuffs, this circumstance when considered with the evidence that 
both participants were acting under the influence, at least partiall:l 
of alcohol, require all alternative theories of Manslaughter to be 
available to the trier of fact. A clear reading of the facts in 
the instant case can only lead this Court to conclude that the tr~ 
court erred in submitting the case to the jury on the alternative 
theories of Manslaughter propounded by appellant and refused by 
the trinl court. 
POINT III 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE JURY 
ON IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE OFFERED BY THE APPELLANT. 
In appellant's proposed Instruction Number 3 (R. 112) 
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the appellant requested an instruction that a witness's testimony 
may be impeached and the credibility of the witness thus affected 
by " ... his character for honesty or veracity or their opposites." 
The trial court failed to so instruct the jury and proper exception 
was taken thereto by appellant (Tr. at 34). 
The State's chief witness at trial was Kim Horrocks, who 
was the only witness who testified that the appellant kicked 
Oliver in the head. At trial appellant called John Watson and 
Elmer Martinez to testify concerning Horrocks' character in the 
community for truth and veracity vel non. This evidence was 
offered to show her lack of character, since the credibili t" of 
Horr0cks was of primary importance during the trial. Rule 22 of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence provides in pertinent part that: 
As affecting the credibility of a witness . 
(c) evidence of traits of his character other 
than truth, honesty, or integrity or their 
opposites, shall be inadmissible .. 
It was upon this basis that the two defense witnesses 
were offered and their testimony admitted by the Court. However, 
in the Court's instruction Number 3 (R. at 146) there is not 
indication of what effect or weight such evidence should bear 
on the jury's deliberations. The effect of such an omission by 
the trial court left the jury with no standard to determine the 
purpose or weight of such evidence. The failure of the Court 
~ guide the jury in weighing the credibility of the defense 
witnesses was error and hence requires reversal of appellant's 
conviction. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW DEFENSE 
WITNESS JOHN WATSON TO GIVE HIS OPINION AS TO 
THE CHARACTER OF KIM HORROCKS FOR TRUTH OR 
VERACITY. 
As argued in Point III of this Brief, appellant offered 
testimony of the character of Kim Horrocks for impeachment purposes. 
The Court refused to allow the testimony of John Watson on this 
issue. The basis of the Court's ruling in a nutshell was that 
Watson had never discussed Horrocks' reputation for truth with 
others in the community of Lark. (Tr. at 15). The trial court 
excluded this evidence even though counsel for appellant layed 
the following foundation: 
Q. (By Mr. Rich) Briefly, what is Kim Horrocks' 
reputation for truth in the community? 
Mr. Marson: Object, your Honor. 
The Court: You have to lay a foundation to show 
how he happens to know. Sustain the objection. 
Q. (By Mr. Rich) How is it you happen to know 
about Kim Horrocks' reputation? 
A. By knowing her, by talking to her, by living in the 
same place. 
Mr. Marson: Your Honor, that is not responsive to 
the question and we object. 
The Court: Well, he is trying to respond. The 
answer may remain. 
Q. (By Mr. Rich) Would you finish that last answer 
that you were just - -
A. By living in the same place, talking to her and 
knowing her is the only thing I could, you know, say 
about her truthfulness, is what is between, like me 
and her, you know. 
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ses. 
Q. For how long had she lived in the community of 
Lark, to your knowledge? 
A. 12 years. 
Q. And you lived in that community with her for that 
period of time or most of that? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. All right. And during that period of both of you 
living in the community of Lark for 12 years, do you 
have an opinion as to what her reputation is? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Mr. Marson: Object, your Honor, as to foundation. 
The Court: Just a moment. I will sustain the 
objection. 
Mr. Rich: I have no other questions. 
Mr. Marson: We have no questions, your Honor. 
McCormick, On Evidence (2d Cleary Ed. 1972) at §44 at 
90 gives the black letter rule on how such character impeachment 
evidence becomes admissible: 
In most jurisdictions the impeacher may attach the 
character of a witness by using the following 
question formula: 
"Do you know the general reputation of William 
Witness in the community in which he lives for 
truth and veracity?" 
"Yes." 
"What is that reputation?" 
"It is bad." 
The questions asked of Watson by counsel for appellant 
Were formulated on these grounds and hence appropriate. The 
testimony of Watson thus should have been allowed. 
- 27 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The offer of such testimony and its weight for 
impeachment purposes has long been recognized as admissible 
in the State of Utah. See §78-24-1 Utah Code Annotated (1953 
as amended), which provides in pertinent part: 
. in every case the credibility of the witness 
may be drawn in question . . . by evidence affecting 
his character, for truth, honesty or integrity ... 
and the ~ury are the exclusive judges of his credi-
bility. 
The failure of the Court to allow the impeachment of 
the primary State's witness is doubly troublesome in the instant 
case, given the blatent character assassination of the accused 
based on alleged specific instances of prior bad acts, as argued 
in Point I of this Brief. The failure of the Court to allow Watsor. 
testimony was reversible error and mandates a new trial. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, appellant respectfully requests that 
due to the individual and collective errors committed at trial 
in the instant case, that this Court should reverse his conviction 
8. See also the early statement of the law in State v. Marks, 
16 U. 204, 51 P. 1089 (1898). 
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son I: 
Jn 
and remand the same for 
RESPECTFULLY 
a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this~ day of March, 
1980. 
O'CONNELL & YENGICH 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I MAILED/DELIVERED two true and 
correct copies of Defendant's Brief to the office of the Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, this e2.5_ day of March, 1980. 
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